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Reliable performance in complex systems is determined in part by the ade-
quacy with which mental models of the system capture accurately the dimen-
sions of system coupling and system complexity. Failure to register coupling
and complexity leads the observer to intervene into an imagined technology
that does not exist and to convert opportunities for error into actual errors. To
decrease the frequency with which this conversion occurs, people can make
their models more complex or the systems they monitor less complex. Neither
type of change is as daunting as it may appear, and this is illustrated by an
analysis of the mental model and system design associated with the invasion of
Grenada.
Introduction
Human reliability is conventionally defined as &dquo;the probability that a person
( 1 ) correctly performs some system-required activity in a required time period
(if time is a limiting factor) and (2) performs no extraneous activity that can
degrade the system&dquo; (Miller and Swain, 1987, p. 221 ). The probability of hu-
man error is often represented by the ratio of errors made to number of oppor-
tunities for error. As Roberts (this issue) has noted, the organizations studied
by the Berkeley project are those where the denominator is large, the numera-
tor small, and both numbers represent the potential for catastrophe. High reli-
ability organizations strive to prevent an opportunity for error from becoming
an occasion of error, especially when errors can enlarge in incomprehensible
ways with inconceivable consequences. To accomplish this goal, high reliabil-
ity organizations seem to pay more attention to the denominator (prevent op-
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portunities for error) than to the numerator (prevent opportunities for error
from becoming occasions of error).
In this essay we take a closer look at the numerator. We argue that opportun-
ities are more likely to be converted into errors when mental models of systems
that are both complex and tightly coupled understate these two dimensions and
thereby become decoupled from the actual state of the system. Thus, reliability
can be improved when mental models represent these two dimensions more
adequately or when the actual values on these two dimensions themselves be-
come simpler and looser. Reliability is a joint product of the model and that
which is modeled.
The argument will be developed in the following manner. First, we examine
the unique constraints that are imposed at the micro level by systems that are
tightly coupled and interactively complex (Perrow, 1984), systems that we will
call &dquo;complex&dquo; for convenience. We pay special attention to the fact that these
systems contain continuous processes, permanent uncertainty and strong emo-
tions. Second, we argue that continuous processes, permanent uncertainty and
strong emotions affect the mental models that operators are able to form of
complex systems. Third, we argue that mental models are. susceptible to disrup-
tion of a kind that is relatively unique to complex systems. We label these dis-
ruptions &dquo;rendition errors.&dquo; Fourth, it is argued that reliable performance
within a tightly coupled complex system can occur when people work on the
very same couplings and complexity that impose strain on their mental models
in the first place. We illustrate this solution using the invasion of Grenada as
an example.
Context created by complex systems
To understand more about how individuals, small groups and teams achieve
reliable performance, we must first understand the context of constraints and
opportunities they face. That context is largely implicit in the other articles in
this issue, and three key qualities of that context need to be made explicit. Nu-
clear carriers, air traffic control systems and nuclear power generation all uti-
lize technologies characterized by continuous processing that is subject to un-
expected interruptions and strong emotions. Continuous processing tightens
the couplings among system components. Unexpected interruptions and strong
emotions add interactive complexity to these tightly coupled components.
Continuous processes in complex systems
Continuous processes in complex systems impose their own imperative, the
reliability imperative. The shift from efficiency to reliability may constitute the
single most important change associated with these systems and their technol-
ogies. Reliability is salient in continuous processing because the overriding is-
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sue is to keep the process doing what it does. This means there is a premium
on maintaining continuity and the integrity of the process. &dquo;Responsibility for
assuring operations continuity is more important than responsibility for ef-
fort&dquo; (Adler, 1986, p. 20).
Reliability has recently been highlighted as an issue of safety in the context
of dangerous technologies that have grown more interactively complex (e.g.
nuclear power plants). But the issue of reliability is larger than the question of
safety. Most of the technologies associated with safety issues are part of a larger
group of technologies, all of which involve continuous processes. The problems
posed by continuous processing are more visible and consequential in technol-
ogies such as nuclear reactors, but the problems are indigenous to all members
of this class. Thus, the current concern with issues of reliability is not just a
reaction to an increase in the number of dangerous technologies, it is sympto-
matic of a larger set of unique issues associated with post-industrial technology
in general. While efficiency was the hallmark of deterministic industrial era
technology, reliability is the hallmark of stochastic, continuous processes as-
sociated with the post-industrial technology.
Perrow’s (1984) diagnosis that the coincidence of tight coupling and tech-
nological complexity has created conditions of interactive complexity and a
new family of failures called &dquo;normal accidents,&dquo; may be an early recognition
that continuous processing in general presents unique problems that require
unique structures.
Unexpected interruptions in complex systems
Reliability is also threatened in complex systems by unexpected interrup-
tions. Davis and Taylor ( 1976 ) suggest that earlier industrial era technologies
were deterministic, with clear cause-effect relationships among what is to be
done, how it is to be done, and when it is to be done. Newer automated tech-
nologies, however, are no longer dominated by determinism. Instead, &dquo;people
operate in an environment whose ’important events’ are randomly occurring
and unpredictable&dquo; (p. 388).
For example, Buchanan and Bessant ( 1985 ) describe the difficulties people
had replacing batch production of pigments with computerized process con-
trols, because an understanding of the mechanisms of pigment chemistry was
weak (p. 298). Neither the speed of the reactions nor the nature of the side
effects were well understood, which meant that manufacturing was &dquo;closer to
alchemy&dquo; than anything else. A world of alchemy is a world of stochastic events.
Technical systems which involve dense interaction, systems such as military
command and control systems, are continually vulnerable to unexpected inter-
ruptions from staff requesting explanations, justifications, revisions, or atten-
tion to the fact that they exist (e.g. Metcalf, 1986; Roberts, in press).
While systems have always been threatened by stochastic events, the unique
twist in newer technologies is that the uncertainties are permanent rather than
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transient. All technologies surprise operators at first, but as learning develops,
surprises decrease. That normal development, however, occurs less often with
new technologies, due to their poorly understood processes, continuous revi-
sions of the design of the process, and the fact that implementation of a process
is often the means by which the technology itself is designed. Furthermore,
with increased dependence on computers, there is the problem that computers
often do not give a complete and accurate picture of the state of the process.
Even more crucial, when computers do give an accurate picture, that picture
can be irrelevant if &dquo;operator state identification and control activities gradu-
ally become decoupled from actual process state as a function of execution
problems or the unexpected&dquo; (Woods et al., 1987, p. 1741 ).
The gradual decoupling of a mental model of a process from the actual steps
that occur in that process, allows events to unfold which ramify in their conse-
quences and grow increasingly incomprehensible. Furthermore, the operator’s
formation of intentions, choice of control activities, and control intervention
can create a novel event that is understood neither by the operator nor by the
devices for self-control designed into the material technology itself. Since the
operator’s representation is itself an intact and plausible view, since the decou-
pling is gradual, and since the immediate consequences of this decoupling are
invisible except for dial fluctuations that could be errors, or independent de-
viations of separate sensors, or a single problem with multiple symptoms, it is
not surprising that &dquo;mistakes&dquo; persist until a &dquo;fresh viewpoint enters the situ-
ation&dquo; (Woods et al., 1987, p. 1745).
These outcomes can potentially occur whenever events interact unnoticed
and unmonitored such that a new technical system and set of interactions is
created without anyone intending it. It is this sense in which humans can trans-
form a linear simple system into one that is interactively complex.
Strong emotions in complex systems
The emphasis on cognition up to this point must be balanced by an equally
strong recognition that reliable performance occurs in the context of strong
emotions.
When people interact with older, more mechanized technologies, they mostly
supply energy and guide tools. As they approach their physical limits in these
two activities, they do so gradually and visibly. But with newer technologies
where people supply regulation and control rather than energy, the work has
become more private, more mental, more complex and more subject to human
limitations on information processing. Not only have tasks become more dif-
ficult with less forewarning that performance will collapse, but organizations
have become more dependent on individual performers, even if this depen-
dence is not recognized by appropriate delegation of authority and autonomy.
The singular effect of these changes is that they reduce the amount of control
people feel they have over their work setting. As predictability and control de-
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crease, people experience higher arousal, more stress and stronger emotions
(Karasek, 1979; Sutton and Kahn, 1987). Thus, we suspect that high arousal
is a frequent accompaniment of mental work in complex systems.
High arousal has predictable effects on performance. Any task, especially
one with stochastic elements, contains several cues which are irrelevant to per-
formance but are noticed anyway. People are distracted by irrelevant cues when
arousal is low, and performance may suffer. As arousal increases, these irrele-
vant cues are ignored and performance improves. Once all irrelevant cues have
been ignored then relevant cues begin to be ignored and performance deterio-
rates (Easterbrook, 1959). Thus, an inverted U relationship between arousal
and performance is hypothesized.
The key point for technology is that the breadth of attention varies in re-
sponse to fluctuations in emotion (see, for example, Weltman et al., 1971).
This variation could affect both task conceptions and performance. It could
affect task conceptions because people try to make sense of whatever they no-
tice. As the breadth of their attention varies, so too should their descriptions of
what they are doing. Thus, task conceptions themselves, not just task perform-
ance, should change as arousal changes. Unreliable ,performance may persist
because the operator is performing a different task than observers realize.
The effect of arousal on task conception is illustrated by Barley’s ( 1986 )
study of medical staff adaptation to CAT scan technology. Technicians at Ur-
ban hospital were the object of a steady stream of directives, imperative speech,
puzzling countermands, sarcasm and usurped control generated by radiolo-
gists. These could easily have raised the level of threat and arousal experienced
by technicians. These increases could have narrowed their attention, made
complex learning more difficult and actually altered their conception of what
kind of task a CAT scanner technology posed for them. These combined effects
would slow their learning, which should have further intensified the pressure
that radiologists imposed, making further learning by the technologists even
more difficult. Since ongoing learning is so much a part of new technologies,
anything that obstructs learning, such as arousal, is of considerable importance.
Even though new technologies make greater demands for abstract mental
work, we must pay as much attention to the fact that those are demands as to
the fact that they are mental. To cope with mental workload is an arousing,
emotional experience, which means that mental processes and products will be
modified by affect. As attention varies, so too do conceptions of the technology
and the effectiveness and reliability of performance. ;
Mental models of complex systems
Continuous processing, unexpected interruptions and strong emotions be-
come important at the individual level because they make it difficult for people
to comprehend the system. That difficulty is serious because of the unusual
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skill requirements that are associated with reliable performance in complex
systems.
A large repertoire of skills must be maintained even though they are used
infrequently. People are usually on standby giving special attention to start-up
and to anticipating faults that might lead to downtime. The distinction be-
tween operations and maintenance is blurred, skills in monitoring and diag-
nostics are crucial, and people must be committed to do what is necessary on
their own initiative and have the autonomy to do so. Humans have assumed
the role of &dquo;variance absorber, dealing with and counteracting the unexpected&dquo;
(Davis and Taylor, 1976, pp. 388-389 ).
To absorb variance, people must first sense the variance. And it is this re-
quirement which highlights the importance of mental models. More and more
of the work associated with new technologies has disappeared into machines,
which means that managers and operators must rely more heavily on inference,
imagination, intuition, problem solving and mental maps, to monitor and un-
derstand what is going on out of sight. Buchanan and Bessant (1985) argue
that people who work with new technologies have to have a complex under-
standing of at least four components: &dquo;1. the process - its layout, sequence of
events and interdependencies; 2. the product - its key characteristics, prop-
erties and variability of raw materials; 3. the equipment - their functions,
capabilities and limitations; 4. the controls - their functions, capabilities and
limitations, and the effects of control actions on performance&dquo; (p. 303). These
four understandings are crucial because the technology is partially self-con-
trolled, and people have to handle the unexpected and provide backup control
when automatic control systems fail. People need sufficient understanding of
abstract events so that they can intervene at any time and pick up the process
or assemble a recovery.
The significance of these demands is that they force people to develop men-
tal models (e.g. Gentner and Stevens, 1983; Rouse and Morris, 1986) of com-
plex systems. A mental model is a representation of a system that explains how
defined inputs are transformed into defined outputs by some plausible cascade
of causal connections. Carroll and Olson (1988) describe a mental model as
&dquo;a rich and elaborate structure, reflecting the user’s understanding of what the
system contains, how it works, and why it works that way. It can be conceived
as knowledge about the system sufficient to permit the user to mentally try out
actions before choosing one to execute&dquo; (p. 51 ) .
Mental models represent a kind of conceptual machine that simulates pro-
cesses in some actual target machine. The conceptual simulations are usually
based on either a metaphor which compares the target system with some other
system already known to the user (e.g. a text editor is a typewriter) or a net-
work representation (Carroll and Olson, 1988, p. 52) which captures the state
a system can be in and the actions that will transform it to another state. Both
representations are helpful in problem solving, but that help is limited because
neither representation captures why the system elements are related the way
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they are nor how the components themselves behave. Furthermore, represen-
tations in the form of metaphors and networks vary in the degree to which they
portray accurately the complexity of the target system and the tightness of its
connections.
The importance of mental models for problems of reliability is that the tech-
nologies which drive reliable systems are basically dual rather than singular.
They involve the material technology of the largely invisible process that is
actually unfolding, and the implicit technology of an imagined process that
exists in the mind of an individual or team. Complex systems have parallel
technologies, a technology in the head and a technology on the floor. Each tech-
nology is self-contained. Each is coordinated with the other intermittently rather
than continuously. Each corrects the other discontinuously. Each can have a
sizeable effect on the other. There are relatively few points at which the mental
representation can be checked against and corrected by the actual process. True,
there are hundreds of discrete sensors that track fluctuations, but those read-
ings do not convey a direct picture of relationships.
Thus, unlike other technologies that have been studied by organizational
theorists, newer technologies exist as much in the head of the operator as they
do on the plant floor. This is not to argue that one technology is more impor-
tant than the other. But it is to argue that cognition and micro-level processes
are a key to understanding reliable performance.
Imperfections in mental models
Traditionally, the errors that produce unreliability have been classified as
errors of omission and errors of commission. Miller and Swain (1987) de-
scribe the distinction this way: &dquo;A person can make an error if he does some-
thing incorrectly, fails to do something he should, or fails to do something in
time. An error of omission occurs when an operator omits a step in a task, or
the entire task. Thus, when a mechanic changes engine oil and puts the new oil
in without replacing the oil-pan drain plug, his omission error results in wasted
oil and a messy garage floor. An error of commission occurs when an operator
does the task, but does it incorrectly. This is a broad category, encompassing
selection errors, sequence errors, time errors and qualitative errors. In the oil-
change example, if the mechanic chooses the wrong-sized socket for tightening
the drain plug, he has made a selection error. If he adds new oil before draining
the old oil, he has made an error in sequence. If he cannot finish the job in the
allotted time, he has made a time error. If he puts too little torque on the oil-
pan drain plug, causing it to leak slowly, he has made a qualitative error&dquo; (p.
221 ).
Now suppose that what it means to do something incorrectly is ambiguous
because there are multiple criteria and trade-offs. Suppose, further, that incom-
plete cause-effect knowledge makes it difficult to prescribe procedures and
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makes it easy to prescribe the use of judgement and improvisation. And sup-
pose, finally, that multiple events occur simultaneously, out of sight, and that
the pace with which they unfold is variable. The resulting picture approximates
complex systems more accurately, and suggests the need to think differently
about what an error means under such conditions.
High reliability systems engage in continuous processing, often assisted by
less visible electronic processes, under conditions where there is incomplete
cause-effect knowledge. Since there is less integration by the machine itself of
discrete measures of system performance (one measurement-one dial), there
must be more integration of data by human monitors. These human monitors
are themselves often tense operators due to the unpredictability of the environ-
ment and the uncontrollability of the process. The combination of low predict-
ability and low control obstructs learning, slows responsiveness and underutil-
izes accumulated experience.
These unique characteristics of high reliability systems create an increased
number of opportunities for error because some of them transform the system
from a linear system into a complex system (e.g. continuous processing, in-
complete cause-effect knowledge, increased demands for integration of data)
and some of them transform a loosely coupled system into a tightly coupled
system (e.g. continuous processing, centralization, electronic interconnec-
tions). This increased number of opportunities for errors is often then con-
verted into an increased number of actual errors when people try to manage
the system using representations of the process that are more linear and less
tight than the process itself. Consequently, the representations are simpler and
slower, which means that interventions into the actual process based on them
will be misplaced, mis-timed, and misunderstood because the process state has
been misidentified.
This is what we mean by the phrase &dquo;rendition error.&dquo; An error of rendition
occurs when a person builds a version (rendition) of the process that fails to
match the level of complexity and tightness of coupling that is characteristic of
the process. Reliance on the mismatched rendition leads to misidentification
of the state of the actual process. This is not to suggest that all cognitive sim-
plification increases the probability of error. Instead, we are suggesting that out
of all possible simplifications that can be made when people model a process,
misjudging the dimensions of coupling and complexity are the most serious for
reliable performance. They are the most serious because these are the two di-
mensions that, if unmanaged and unmonitored, increase the likelihood of nor-
mal accidents. In complex systems, errors of commission and omission still
occur, which means the distinction remains viable. However, these two tradi-
tional forms occur relative to the rendition and not relative to the actual pro-
cess itself.
To worry about errors of rendition is not to ignore the material system itself.
Material artifacts set sensemaking processes in motion, and sensemaking has
no alternative but to deal with technology rather than ignore it. What we are
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trying to emphasize is not that people ignore technology, but rather that the
increased mental workload created by stochastic continuous events forces peo-
ple to impose more of their own interpretations to understand what is occurring.
Interactive complexity is intrinsically difficult to understand, which means
that whatever understanding people do arrive at, has a substantially larger pro-
portion of themselves woven into it. People project more of themselves into
complex systems of necessity. As they do so, the constraints imposed by
bounded rationality limit the number and complexity of the interactions they
are able to model. Complex systems could be said to consist of fast technologies
and slow minds. People interact as much with their own interpretation of the
system which they encode in mental models as they do with the material arti-
facts themselves. But the artifacts are clearly there throughout the sensemaking
process, although exactly what is there is open to a variety of perceptions and
conceptions.
Thus, the errors that breach reliable performance are qualitatively different
from errors that breach efficient performance. Efficient performance is breached
when people stray from guidelines and err in executing an intention. Reliable
performance is breached when people misidentify the state of a process and
form the wrong intention. Incomplete mental models are an important source
of wrong intentions. And underestimates of tight coupling and technical com-
plexity are an important source of incomplete models.
Coping with imperfections in mental models
To increase the accuracy with which coupling and complexity are repre-
sented in mental models, people can do one of two things. They can make their
models more complex or the processes they model more simple. Both tactics
were used by Metcalf when he commanded the Grenada invasion. A careful
examination of some of his tactics suggests how representations are kept cou-
pled with the complex systems they represent.
Command and control in Grenada
This analysis is focused on the communication technology that Metcalf
(1986) constructed to manage military forces during the Grenada rescue
operation.
Metcalf’s strategy was heavily influenced by his earlier experience with the
evacuation of Saigon. Saigon was a politically charged situation in which the
on-scene commanders were the object of 
&dquo; ’the six thousand mile screwdriver’
- the minute direction of the day-to-day operations of a field commander by
higher and remote authority&dquo; (p. 278).
Grenada was also a politically charged situation and raised the same temp-
tations for remote direction. Metcalf described the context this way: &dquo;I knew
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the Grenada operation represented tremendous political risks. Because of the
risks, particularly in peacetime, there is a natural tendency for higher authority
to move down and attempt to control local actions from afar. In this day of
instant communications from and to anywhere in the world, combined with
the high stakes involved, the local commander has an obligation to communi-
cate information up if he expects to retain control. Higher command authority
must always have information, or they will remove control from the local com-
mander&dquo; (p. 285 ).
To retain local control, Metcalf used situation reports, a command voice,
explicit advance plans, staff warnings and a party line to enact an environment
up the chain of command that told him to do essentially what he wanted to do.
&dquo;I organized the structure of decision making in a way that, I thought, would
maximize the delegation of authority down to me, whereas below me, I dele-
gated ’what’ to do to my subordinates and they were responsible for the ’how’ &dquo;
(p. 279 ).
Metcalf directed his staff to send at least two situation reports upward every
hour, whether there was anything to report or not. Not only did these reports
keep the National Command Authority informed, but they also kept their staffs
busy &dquo;reading messages, not telling me what to do&dquo; (p. 285). These reports
were written in plain English rather than computer format which meant that
they could be used (and were used) by a wide variety of audiences to stay
abreast of happenings (p. 291 ) . These audiences became dependent on the
reports which enabled Metcalf to influence how these audiences defined the
situation in Grenada. Because this reporting system was reliable and antici-
pated queries before they became issues, its reports were taken to be the &dquo;true&dquo;
state of affairs, even when other communication channels into the Pentagon
carried information that was at odds with Metcalf’s version. Conflicting infor-
mation is inevitable in &dquo;the fog of battle.&dquo; The problem is, when people with
competing interests try to decide which is the &dquo;true&dquo; version, the fog intensi-
fies, decision making is slowed, opportunities are lost and contradictory direc-
tives are issued.
In addition to the frequent situational reports, Metcalf also assigned an ex-
perienced operations officer to the one secure phone from Grenada to head-
quarters in Norfolk (p. 285) and this same person was the command voice
during all active combat operations. &dquo;The commander in chief and his staff
always heard the same voice, a voice they knew and could relate to. The object
was to create the impression that, in fact, we were in control and knew what
was going on&dquo; (p. 285 ).
Control was also gained through the use of advance planning, alteration of
staff job descriptions and public communication. Operational plans for the next
day were formulated by 5:00 PM each day so that higher authorities could re-
view Metcalf’s intentions in the context of his own estimates of needs and
strengths. &dquo;Usually they turned my ’intentions’ into a directive telling me to do
what I told them I was going to do&dquo; (p. 285).
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Staff people responsible for briefing their bosses also represented a threat to
intentions because they overloaded Metcalf’s staff with requests for informa-
tion that might suggest other lines of action. Most of the information they re-
quested had been provided in previous messages so Metcalf, early in the oper-
ation, &dquo;informed&dquo; the watch officer for the US Commander-in-Chief of the
Atlantic Command, at 4:00 AM, to &dquo;please get off my back&dquo; (p. 292). The
unexpected &dquo;request&dquo; worked and a staff officer was then assigned the task of
screening everything sent to Metcalf. &dquo;I am told they had an enormous reject
bin&dquo; (p. 292).
And finally, because of limited communication equipment, the entire Gren-
ada task force was on a party line. &dquo;When either my call sign or Admiral
McDonald’s went out over the circuit, the line was instantly cleared. Captains
of the ships huddled around the CIC to listen in, and so this particular party
line came to serve a very useful function. It conveyed our intentions to those
commanders, without my having to go over them again individually with each
captain ... Everyone involved in the mission decision making knew the in-
tended plans and the pressures on local command&dquo; (p. 292).
Matching models with systems in Grenada
Metcalf’s experience in Grenada is relevant to our more general interest in
reliable performance because he managed a continuous process that was sub-
ject to unexpected events (e.g. Cuban strength was seriously underestimated).
The system itself generated repeated opportunities for error, both because it
was interactively complex (e.g. activities of different armed services had to be
coordinated using tourist maps because military maps did not exist for this
area) and because it was tightly coupled (e.g. Rules of Engagement such as
&dquo;minimize casualties&dquo; (p. 282) imposed constraints on the choice of options).
What is instructive is the way Metcalf worked within these constraints to make
his mental model more complex and tightly coupled while he simultaneously
worked to make the system he modeled less complex and more loosely coupled.
These joint efforts decrease the chance that his mental model becomes decou-
pled from the system it is designed to model. As the probability of decoupling
decreases, so too does the probability that an opportunity for error will become
an actual error.
We look first at the dimension of complexity. Metcalf’s earlier experience in
Saigon gave him a rough model to start with in structuring his command and
control system in Grenada. He had some idea what to expect, but perhaps even
more important, he had some idea of how his expectations could be inter-
rupted and micro-managed from afar. The Saigon experience, in short, in-
creased the repertoire of skills and diagnoses Metcalf brought to the situation
in Grenada. This increment is crucial because it has been suggested that capa-
bility affects perception (Jervis, 1976). People will perceive those events which
they believe they can do something about, and will neglect those for which they
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have no response. People with many skills can afford to notice more details
because whatever they find, there is a good chance that they can do something
about it. Thus a person’s repertoire has a significant effect on how much of the
situation is noticed. The larger the repertoire, the larger the set of goals among
which one can choose, because increased perception is likely to reveal more
leverage points in the situation. The point is that Metcalf’s experience in Sai-
gon increased the complexity of his mental models which in turn allowed him
to simplify the actual system he built in Grenada. Both changes improve the
match between the model and that which is modeled on the relevant dimension
of complexity.
Other ways in which complexity is managed in Grenada include the use of
face-to-face meetings (p. 289). Daft and Lengel ( 1984) have shown that face-
to-face conversations are rich media capable of sensing a greater range of com-
plexity in situations. Thus, the frequent use of rich media improves the match
between the complexity of Metcalf’s models and the situations those models
represent. As both Roberts and Rochlin note (this issue), negotiation, bargain-
ing and talk occur nonstop on nuclear carriers. This can be viewed as a contin-
uing effort to match the complexity of an ongoing system, with the most com-
plex human activity capable of sensing that complexity, face-to-face interaction.
Metcalf’s continuing revision of structures (e.g. his use of General Schwarz-
kopf in a variety of roles such as liaison, deputy, p. 281 ) can be viewed as a
novel solution to a classic problem in organizational structure. When faced
with complex environments and non-routine problems, organizations typically
choose one of two solutions. They either divide the problem into lots of pieces
and coordinate the solutions by means of complex structures or they keep the
problems intact and assign them to complex people such as professionals (Scott,
1987, p. 236).
While Metcalf leaned toward the latter solution, he also allowed the interac-
tions among professionals to construct structures which then affected further
interactions in the field, with a further effect on structure. Thus, structure is
both an independent and dependent variable in Metcalf’s design. He relies on
complex performances rather than upon complex performers or complex struc-
tures. This solution is closer to the newer models of structuration in the orga-
nizational literature (e.g. Barley, 1986; Turner, 1988 ) than to the older models
of fixed structures’ built-in response to technological imperatives.
Structuration is an elegant way to build a mental model of a complex system.
It simultaneously simplifies the system being modeled (interaction creates an
interpretable structure) and it complicates the models of the people who are
doing the modeling (the structure that is created forces people to pay more
attention to one another). Thus the model and that which is modeled match
more closely.
Not only are Metcalf’s designs sensitive to issues of complexity, they are also
sensitive to issues of coupling. Metcalf manages upward in order to &dquo;maximize
the delegation of authority down to me.&dquo; Said differently, Metcalf manages in
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order to loosen the coupling between himself and his superiors, but he does so,
not by ignoring them, but by demonstrating repeatedly that he is a credible
commander (Henshel, 1987). Metcalf also loosens the coupling between him-
self and his subordinates by telling them what to do but allowing them to de-
termine how they will do it.
What is interesting about these efforts is that they loosen the couplings among
system parts, but in doing so, they also reduce complexity. They reduce com-
plexity because they decrease the likelihood that events can ramify widely, in
incomprehensible ways, with unanticipated consequences. A system with looser
couplings is often also a system that is less complex. While complexity and
coupling are typically viewed as orthogonal dimensions, the arguments raised
here suggest that changes in one dimension can affect the other. Metcalf con-
structed a loosely coupled system that he knew and could comprehend, but the
system was also less complex because of the prior experience he had had under
related conditions.
Efforts to loosen couplings are also visible in Metcalf’s insistence that his
intentions for tomorrow’s actions be in the hands of his superiors by 5:00 PM
the preceding day. This builds in time to negotiate should the superiors prefer
a different strategy than the one proposed. This tactic loosens the coupling be-
tween today and tomorrow, a coupling that is normally tight when operations
are continuous. In a tightly coupled world, what I will do at 5:00 AM is often
determined by what I did at 4:58 AM and was told to do by my superiors at
4:59 AM. In a loosely coupled world, what I will do at 5:00 AM can be anything
that I am able to negotiate between 5:00 PM the previous evening and 5:00 AM
the next morning.
Metcalf’s decisions within the context of the Rules of Engagement (p. 281 )
provide an interesting example of simultaneous loose-tight coupling. Metcalf
repeatedly turns to the three Rules of Engagement for guidance, invokes them
consistently as constraints on his own decisions, but retains discretion over
everything else. What is interesting about this is that it appears to be a good
example of simultaneous centralization and decentralization, a structural com-
bination which is crucial for reliable performance yet rare in ongoing organi-
zations (Weick, 1987, pp. 124-126). The premises for Metcalf’s decision are
centralized, but what he does within these broad constraints is left to his dis-
cretion. Thus, both the efficiency of centralization and the effectiveness of de-
centralization are possible within this structure. Most important, Metcalf’s use
of the Rules of Engagement reduces both tight coupling and interactive com-
plexity. Tight coupling is reduced because premises are translated into deci-
sions that are responsive to local conditions. Complexity is reduced because
decisions that are locally responsive create a system that is easier to compre-
hend, easier to model and easier to keep track of.
While we could elaborate the Grenada example even further, the point we
wish to make is that systems characterized by tight coupling and interactive
complexity can be managed toward levels of high reliability, if mental models
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are made more complex and if systems are made less complex. Models are made
more complex by such devices as diverse experience, pooling of experience
among people, imagination, narrative thinking and training in cognitive inte-
gration. Systems are made less complex through such devices as delegation of
authority, proactive management upward, placing people rather than ma-
chines in control loops and using talk to hold the system together.
Conclusion
What we have tried to show is that the micro-structure of reliable perform-
ance has a significant cognitive component, due in part to the nature of the
systems in which reliability is a salient issue. What is striking about these sys-
tems is that their continuous processes are less visible, sensible and compre-
hensible, yet their reliability is heavily dependent on human interventions that
presume high visibility, sensibility and comprehensibility. Operators manage
this discrepancy by creating an imagined system. The adequacy of this repre-
sentation as well as its ability to keep up with the actual system determine re-
liable performance.
There are several action implications of this perspective. First, mental models
of complex systems should be made explicit so that they can be modified. Car-
roll and Olson ( 1988 ), for example, suggest that this can be done if the trainer
provides the user with metaphors before the system is studied in order to en-
rich the imagery in the mental model the user constructs. The trainer can also
encourage the user to generate metaphors that are personally meaningful, at
each stage in the instruction. In either case, imagery, representation and nar-
rative thinking are encouraged rather than discouraged. Reliable performance
is not necessarily dependent on a literal duplication of the system model. That
is impossible, but all approximations are not equally useful. Those representa-
tions which preserve interactive complexity (e.g. the representation portrays
causal interactions that could produce vicious circles; Weick, 1979, Chapter 3)
and those representations that preserve tight coupling (e.g. the representation
portrays swift, large causal effects) are more likely to be useful.
Second, system design should not be treated as a given. To do so is to avoid
testing the possibility that small material changes may have large effects (Weick,
1984). What is notable about Metcalf’s efforts in Grenada is that they involve
close attention to small details that have large effects. People have some control
over some aspects of any complex situation. Even though the control appears
to be small, that does not mean that it is insignificant.
By definition, systems that are high in interactive complexity are systems in
which competence can be multiplied. A 5:00 meeting, a message every half
hour and a familiar voice, all seemingly trivial, can set in motion large changes
that improve comprehension, manageability and reliable performance. Fur-
thermore, human interventions can also slow a set of changes that are already
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in motion. Metcalf dampens the intrusiveness of staff requests, slows the pace
of invasion and has what amounts to several simultaneous conversations over
the &dquo;party line,&dquo; all of which enact a system that he can model more accurately
with the models that have worked for him in the past.
Third, provisions must be made to acknowledge and accept the emotional
intensity of life in complex systems. The mere fact of acknowledgement rather
than denial may itself have a calming influence and improve performance. What
frightens people are seemingly inappropriate emotions that call into question
their grasp of the situation. Situations with no meaning whatsoever are more
troublesome and arousing than are situations where the meaning is clear, even
if it is unpleasant. Furthermore, things as diverse as social support, user-friendly
machine interfaces and counseling to assist with problems away from work, all
contribute to reliable performance because they all address the fact that stress
is additive. To attack arousal on several fronts is to reduce the extent to which
it edits crucial material out of mental models.
Finally, complex, tightly coupled systems impose more demands than any
one person can handle. Metcalf, despite all of his expertise, wisdom and intu-
ition, did not manage Grenada singlehandedly. Instead, there was an interde-
pendent team of diverse, credible, trusting people able to envision and act on
a collective mental model that was more complex than any one of them could
articulate. Collective requisite variety is a prerequisite for reliable performance
in complex systems. When the problem is one of adequate representation of
invisible events on a continuous basis, there are no great operators, only great
operations. There may be many charismatic leaders, but there are few charis-
matic modelers. Charisma, in complex systems, is a social accomplishment that
involves a shared mental model.
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